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Abstract
We examine the measurement and prediction of worker productivity using a sample of teachers
and school principals. We find that principals’ evaluations are positively associated with
teachers’ estimated contributions to students’ test scores (value-added), and are better predictors
of teacher value-added than are teacher credentials. Principals’ assessments of teachers’
cognitive and non-cognitive skills are strongly associated with principals’ overall teacher
evaluations and to a lesser extent with teacher value-added. While past teacher value-added
predicts future value-added, principals’ subjective ratings can provide additional information,
particularly when prior value-added measures are based on a single year of teacher performance.
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I. Introduction
Recent research consistently finds that teacher productivity is the most
important component of a school’s effect on student learning and that there is
considerable heterogeneity in teacher productivity within and across schools
(Rockoff (2004), Hanushek, et al. (2005), Rivkin, Hanushek and Kain (2005),
Kane, Rockoff and Staiger (2008), Aaronson, Barrow and Sander (2007)).
However, relatively little is known about what makes some teachers more
productive than others in promoting student achievement. The first few years of
teacher experience improve productivity (Rockoff (2004), Hanushek, et al.
(2005), Jepsen (2005), Rivkin, Hanushek and Kain (2005), Boyd, et al. (2006),
Clotfelter, Ladd and Vigdor (2006, 2007, 2010), Kane, Rockoff and Staiger
(2008), Harris and Sass (2011)). But little else in the way of observed teacher
characteristics seems to consistently matter.1 Thus, while teachers significantly
impact student achievement, the variation in teacher productivity is still largely
unexplained by commonly measured teacher characteristics.
One possible explanation for the inability of extant research to identify the
determinants of teacher productivity is that researchers have not been measuring
the characteristics that truly affect productivity. Recent work in labor economics
suggests, for example, that personality traits such as conscientiousness play an
important role in determining worker productivity (Borghans, ter Weel, and
Weinberg (2008), Cunha, Heckman, Lochner, and Masterov (2006); Heckman,
Stixrud, and Urzua (2006)). But the relative predictive value of cognitive and

1

Harris and Sass (2011) find that the gains to experience may extend well beyond the first few
years. Clotfelter, Ladd and Vigdor (2007, 2010), using North Carolina data, find some teacher
credentials are correlated with teacher effectiveness, particularly at the secondary level.
Goldhaber (2007) also uses the North Carolina data and finds similar results, though he questions
the signal value of credentials that are weakly correlated with productivity.
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non-cognitive factors is hard to assess due to the difficulty in obtaining measures
of both cognitive and non-cognitive skills and labor productivity.
Unraveling the factors associated with teacher productivity could yield
valuable insights into the most appropriate policies for selecting and training
teachers.

If teacher productivity is affected primarily by personality

characteristics that are measurable ex-ante, they could be used to screen
applicants and identify the most desired candidates in the hiring process.

If,

however, the most important teacher characteristics are malleable, such as subject
content knowledge, determining which teacher characteristics have the greatest
impact on student learning could inform the design of pre-service and in-service
teacher training programs
Intertwined with the relationship between teacher characteristics and
teacher productivity is the issue of how best to evaluate teacher performance. If
teacher productivity is not strongly correlated with teacher credentials like
educational attainment, but is associated with skills that can be discerned through
observing behavior, direct monitoring and evaluation of teacher performance may
be advantageous. Consistent with this idea, school principals are being granted
greater authority in hiring, evaluation and retention of teachers both through the
creation of independent charter schools nationwide and through decentralization
reforms in public school districts such as New York City. Spurred on by the
federal Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) and Race to the Top (RTTT) initiatives,
classroom observations by principals or external evaluators are increasingly being
used to make high-stakes decisions about employment and compensation.2 The
downside of subjective evaluations by principals is they may be affected by

2

For in-depth discussions of performance-based compensation in schools see Figlio and Kenny
(2007) and Podgursky and Springer (2007).
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personal bias toward factors unrelated to productivity and some principals may
simply be poor judges of teacher productivity.
Another possibility is that neither teacher credentials nor observable traits
are correlated with a teacher’s productivity. In this case ex-post evaluation of
teachers based on their contributions to student achievement, or “value-added,”
may be optimal (Gordon, Kane, and Staiger (2006)). The TIF and RTTT reforms
also generally involve teacher value-added as part of the overall evaluation.
However, there are concerns about the precision of value-added measures, their
narrow focus on student test scores, and the fact that they can only be calculated
for a small proportion of teachers (Baker et al. (2010); Harris (2011)).
In this paper we consider the two interrelated issues of the skills associated
with teacher productivity and how best to evaluate teacher performance.
Specifically, we address the following four questions:
1) What characteristics of teachers are associated with teacher productivity?
2) What information do principals use in assessing teacher performance?
3) How

closely

are

principal

evaluations

associated

with

teacher

productivity?
4) How well do principal evaluations and prior measures of teacher
productivity predict future teacher productivity?
We build on extant research in four ways. First, we go beyond general
ratings of teacher ability and estimate the relationship between a variety of
specific teacher personality traits and teacher productivity. Second, we test how
well prior value-added scores and prior principal evaluations of teachers predict
future teacher value-added. The ability to predict future performance is critical,
especially when probationary employment periods are followed by decisions that
provide long-term job security to employees (e.g., teacher tenure) that can affect
organizational performance for years or decades. Third, unlike other existing
studies, we consider how the relationships between teacher characteristics,

3

principal evaluations and teacher value-added vary between elementary and
middle/high schools, each of which has distinctive organizational structures.
Finally, while most of our results are from value-added measures based on a lowstakes test, we also consider results from high-stakes achievement tests, though
the usefulness of these is limited by much smaller samples in our data set.
In the next section we describe the small existing literature on subjective
evaluations of teachers and their relationship with value-added. This is followed
by a discussion of the data used for our analysis, including how the interviews
with principals were conducted and our method for estimating teacher valueadded. In the concluding section we discuss our empirical results and possible
policy implications.
II. Literature Review
The labor economics literature increasingly integrates theories and
research from psychology. For example, Cuhna, et al. (2006) model the life cycle
of skill attainment, giving a prominent position to personality traits. Borghans, ter
Weel, and Weinberg (2008) theorize that different types of jobs require different
combinations of personality traits, especially “directness” and “caring,” and find
evidence that some of these traits are correlated with productivity. This is perhaps
not surprising, especially for jobs (such as teaching) that require substantial
interpersonal interaction and communication, but it does suggest that economists
may need to consider more than intelligence when evaluating the role of innate
ability in labor market outcomes (Borghans, et al. (2008)).
Personality traits are difficult to measure objectively (Borghans, et al.
(2008)) and perhaps more easily captured through direct observation. For this
reason, the importance of personality traits in determining productivity may also
affect the optimal mix of subjective supervisor ratings and more objective

4

measures of output in evaluating and compensating workers. There is a long
history of research studying the relationships between subjective and objective
measures of worker productivity, as well as the implications of this relationship
for optimal employment contracts. As noted by Jacob and Lefgren (2008), this
research suggests that there is a relatively weak relationship between subjective
and objective measures (Bommer, et al. (1995), Heneman (1986)). One reason
might be that supervisors are heavily influenced by personality traits, more so
than is warranted by the role personality actually plays in (objective) productivity.
This interpretation is reinforced by evidence that evaluators’ subjective
assessments are biased, in the sense that certain types of workers (e.g., females
and older workers) receive lower subjective evaluations for reasons that appear
unrelated to their actual productivity (e.g., Varma and Stroh (2001)).
There is a limited literature that specifically addresses the relationship
between subjective and objective assessments of school teachers.

Subjective

evaluations by school principals are especially interesting because principals are
typically required to observe teachers and they collect a lot of information
informally, and inexpensively, in the natural course of being in the school,
interacting with teachers, talking with parents and so on. Three older studies have
examined the relationship between student test scores and principals’ subjective
assessments using longitudinal student achievement data to measure student
learning growth (Murnane (1975), Armor, et al. (1976), and Medley and Coker
(1987)). However, as noted by Jacob and Lefgren (2008), these studies do not
account for measurement error in the objective test-based measure and therefore
under-state the relationship between subjective and objective measures.
In their work, Jacob and Lefgren address both the selection bias and
measurement error problems within the context of a value-added model for
measuring teacher productivity that is linked to principals’ subjective
assessments. They obtain student achievement data and combine it with data on

5

principals’ ratings of 201 teachers in a mid-sized school district in a Western
state.3

Jacob and Lefgren find that previous teacher value-added is a better

predictor of current student achievement than are current principal ratings. In
particular, teacher value-added calculated from test scores in 1998-2002 was a
significantly better predictor of 2003 test scores (conditional on student and peer
characteristics) than were 2003 principal ratings made just prior to the 2003
student exam. The current principal ratings were also significantly correlated
with current test scores, conditional on prior value-added.

While this latter

finding suggests contemporaneous principal ratings add information, the reason is
not clear. The principal ratings might provide more precise indicators of previous
teacher productivity (especially when there is little prior test score information, as
is often the case), since past value-added is subject to transient shocks to student
test scores. Alternatively, the principal ratings may simply reflect new currentschool-year (2002/03) performance information not included in past value-added
(based on test scores through 2001/02). In order to sort out these effects, in our
analysis we compare the ability of current value-added and current principal
ratings to predict future teacher value-added.
The only prior study to consider principals’ assessments of specific
teacher characteristics, as opposed to the overall rating, is an unpublished working
paper by Jacob and Lefgren (2005). While they find a positive and significant
relationship between the teacher value-added and teachers’ relationship with the
school administration, this is the only teacher characteristic they consider.
Rockoff, et al. (forthcoming) study an experiment in which elementary
and middle school principals in New York City were randomly assigned to
receive teacher value-added information. They found that principals change their
evaluations of teachers when they receive new information about the impact of
3

As in the present study, the district studied by Jacob and Lefgren chose to remain anonymous.
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teachers on student test scores. The extent of updating is positively related to the
precision of value-added information they receive and negatively related to the
quality of their own prior information on teachers.

The acquisition of new

information also appears to have significant effects on personnel decisions and
student outcomes. Rockoff, et al. find that teachers with low value-added scores
were more likely to exit their schools after the principal received value-added
information which in turn led to a small increase in student test scores. While not
the focus of their analysis, Rockoff, et al. also estimate pre-experiment
correlations between various value-added measures and principals’ evaluations of
their teachers. They find positive correlations, similar in magnitude to those
obtained by Jacob and Lefgren.

The correlations tend to increase with the

precision of the value-added estimates and with the number of years the principal
has known a teacher.
Most recently, Kane, et al. (2012) report interim results from the Measures
of Effective Teaching (MET) project, sponsored by the Gates Foundation. The
project measures teacher productivity in different ways, including through student
evaluations, observations of classroom practice by trained evaluators, and, as in
our study, student performance on two different achievement tests.4 The MET
project does not include principal evaluations, however. Kane, et al. compare the
ability of teacher observations, student surveys and value-added in one classroom

4

A number of other studies have examined the relationship between the achievement levels of
teachers’ students and subjective teacher ratings that are based on formal standards and extensive
classroom observation (Gallagher (2004), Kimball et al. (2004), Milanowski (2004)). For
example, in Milanowski (2004), the subjective evaluations are based on an extensive standardsframework that required principals and assistant principals to observe each teacher six times in
total and, in each case, to rate the teacher on 22 separate dimensions. All of these studies find a
positive and significant relationship, despite differences in the way they measure teacher valueadded and in the degree to which the observations are used for high-stakes personnel decisions.
While these studies have the advantage of more structured subjective evaluations, the reliance on
achievement levels with no controls for lagged achievement or prior educational inputs makes it
difficult to estimate teacher value-added.
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to predict teacher value added in another course section by the same teacher in the
same time period.5 They find that the best predictor is value added, with only a
modest improvement from adding in classroom observations and student
feedback.

III. Data and Methods
We begin by describing the general characteristics of the school district
and sample of principals, teachers and students. We then discuss in more detail
the two main components of the data: (a) administrative data that are used to
estimate teacher value-added; and (b) principal interview data that provide
information about principals’ overall assessments of teachers as well as ratings of
specific teacher characteristics.
A. General Sample Description
The analysis is based on interviews with 30 principals from an anonymous
mid-sized Florida school district.

The district includes a heterogeneous

population of students. For example, among the sampled schools, the schoolaverage proportion of students eligible for free/reduced price lunches varies from
less than 10 percent to more than 90 percent. Similarly, there is considerable
heterogeneity among schools in the racial/ethnic distribution of their students.
We interviewed principals from 17 elementary (or K-8) schools, six middle
schools, four high schools, and three special population schools, representing
more than half of the principals in the district.

The racial distribution of

interviewed principals is comparable to the national average of all principals
(sample district: 78 percent White; national: 82 percent White) as is the
5

They also evaluate the relative performance of the measures to “predict” past performance by the
same teacher.
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percentage with at least a master’s degree (sample district: 100 percent; national:
90.7 percent).6

However, the percentage female is somewhat larger (sample

district: 63 percent; national: 44 percent).
The advantage of studying a school district in Florida is that the state has a
long tradition of strong test-based accountability (Harris, Herrington and Albee,
2007) that has now come to pass in other states as a result of the federal No Child
Left Behind policy. The state has long graded schools on an A-F scale. The
number of schools receiving the highest grade has risen over time; in our sample
20 schools received the highest grade (A) during the 2005-06 school year; the
lowest performing school in the district received a grade of D. It is reasonable to
expect that accountability policies, such as the school grades mentioned above,
influence the objectives that principals see for their schools and therefore their
subjective evaluations of teachers.

For example, we might expect a closer

relationship

and

between

value-added

subjective

assessments

in

high

accountability contexts where principals are not only more aware of test scores in
general, but where principals are increasingly likely to know the test scores, and
perhaps test score gains, made by students of individual teachers. We discuss the
potential influence of this phenomenon later in the analysis, but emphasize here
that, by studying a Florida school district, the results of our analysis are more
applicable to the current policy environment where high-stakes achievementfocused accountability is federal policy.

6

The national data on principals comes from the 2003-2004 Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS)
as reported in the Digest of Education Statistics (National Center for Education Statistics, 2006).
Part of the reason that this sample of principals has higher levels of educational attainment is that
Florida law makes it difficult to become a principal without a master’s degree.
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B. Student Achievement Data and Modeling
Throughout Florida there is annual testing in grades 3-10 for both math
and reading. Until recently, two tests were administered, a high-stakes, criterionreferenced exam based on the state curriculum standards known as the FCATSunshine State Standards (SSS) exam, and a low-stakes, norm-referenced test
(NRT) which is the Stanford Achievement Test. We mainly employ the lowstakes NRT in the present analysis for two reasons. First, it is a vertically scaled
test, meaning that unit changes in the achievement score should have the same
meaning at all points along the scale. Second, and most importantly, the district
under study also administers the NRT in grades 1 and 2, allowing us to compute
achievement gains for students in grades 2-10. Achievement data on the NRT are
available for each of the school years 1999/00 through 2007/08.7 The SSS exam
was instituted a year later and thus scores on the high-stakes test are only
available for the 2000/01-2007/08 school years. Using the low-stakes test we are
able to estimate the determinants of achievement gains for five years prior to the
principal interviews, 2000/01-2005/06, and for two years after the interviews,
2006/07-2007/08. In order to account for any differences in test content and
scaling across grades across time, we normalize test scores by grade and year.
Characteristics of the sample used in the value-added analysis are described in
Table 1.
In order to compute value-added scores for teachers we estimate a model
of student achievement, At, of the following form:

Ait  Ait 1  β1Xit  β2 Pijmt   k  m   g   gt   it

7

Prior to 2004/05 version 9 of the Stanford Achievement Test (SAT-9) was administered.
Beginning in 2004/05 the SAT-10 was given. All SAT-10 scores have been converted to SAT-9
equivalent scores based on the conversion tables in Harcourt (2002).

10

(1)

The effects of prior educational inputs are captured by the lagged test score, Ait-1,
and are assumed to diminish geometrically over time at a rate (1-). The vector
Xit includes time-varying student characteristics such as student mobility,
free/reduced-price lunch eligibility and limited English proficiency status as well
as time-constant student attributes like race/ethnicity and gender. The vector of
peer characteristics, P-ijmt (where the subscript –i students other than individual i
in the classroom), includes both exogenous peer characteristics and the number of
peers or class size. In addition, a teacher fixed effect (k), a school fixed effect
(m) and a sets of grade-repeater-by-grade (g) and grade-by-year indicators (gt)
are also included.8 The teacher fixed effect captures both the time-invariant
characteristics of teachers as well as the average value of time-varying
characteristics like experience and possession of an advanced degree.

Since

school fixed effects are included, the estimated teacher effects represent the
“value-added” of an individual teacher relative to the average teacher at the
school. The final term, it, is a mean zero random error.
The achievement model depicted in equation (1) is but one of many
commonly estimated value-added models. We utilize it as our primary model
since recent experimental and simulation-based evidence suggests it is likely to
produce relatively unbiased estimates of teacher effects under a range of
conditions ((Kane and Staiger (2008), Guarino, Reckase and Wooldridge (2011)).
However, we show in Appendix Table A2 that the relationship between valueadded estimates of teacher productivity and principal evaluations of teacher
quality are similar when other value-added models, ones that assume complete

8

The full set of student and peer explanatory variables is delineated in appendix table A1.
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persistence in prior inputs or control for student heterogeneity with student fixed
effects, are employed.9
Recently, Rothstein (2010) has argued that value-added models may
produce biased estimates of teacher productivity due to the non-random
assignment of students to teachers within schools. For example, if students who
experience an unusually high achievement gain in one year are assigned to
particular teachers the following year and there is mean reversion in student test
scores, the estimated value-added for the teachers with high prior-year gains will
be biased downward. Rothstein proposes falsification tests based on the idea that
future teachers cannot have causal effects on current achievement gains. We
conduct falsification tests of this sort, using the methodology employed by Koedel
and Betts (2011). For each level of schooling, elementary, middle and high, we
fail to reject the null of strict exogeneity, indicating that the data from the district
we analyze in this study are not subject to the sort of dynamic sorting bias
concerns raised by Rothstein.10
As noted by Jacob and Lefgren, another concern is measurement error in
the estimated teacher effects. Given the variability in student test scores, valueadded estimates will yield “noisy” measures of teacher productivity, particularly
for teachers with relatively few students (McCaffrey, et al (2009)). We employ
three strategies to alleviate the measurement error problem. First, we limit our
sample to teachers who taught at least five students with achievement gain data.
Second, we employ the measurement-error correction procedure adopted by Jacob
and Lefgren when evaluating the strength of correlations between value-added
9

For a thorough discussion of various value-added models and the assumptions that underlie
them, see Todd and Wolpin (2003) and Harris, Sass and Semykina (2011).
10

The failure to reject strict exogeneity may indicate that prior test-score gains are not used to
assign students to teachers in the studied district or to the fact that we are including many cohorts
of students per teacher in our analysis (Koedel and Betts (2011)).
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and subjective evaluations by principals.11 Third, in regression analyses where
value-added is the dependent variable we use a feasible generalized least squares
(FGLS) estimation procedure which accounts for estimation error in the
dependent variable.12 As noted by Mihaly et al. (2010), standard fixed-effects
software routines compute fixed effects relative to some arbitrary hold-out unit
(e.g. an omitted teacher), which can produce wildly incorrect standard errors and
thus inappropriate corrections for measurement error in the estimated teacher
effects. Therefore, to estimate the teacher effects and their standard errors we
employ the Stata routine felsdvregdm, developed by Mihaly et al. (2010), which
imposes a sum-to-zero constraint on the teacher estimated teacher effects within a
school and produces the appropriate standard errors for making measurement
error adjustments.13
C. Principal Interview Data
Interviews were conducted in the summer of 2006. Each principal was
asked to rate up to ten teachers in grades and subjects that are subject to annual
student achievement testing. Per the requirements of the district, the interviews
were “single-blind” so that the principal knew the names of the teachers but the
interviewer knew only a randomly assigned number associated with the names.
From the administrative data described above, we identified teachers in
tested grades and subjects in the 30 schools who had taught at least one course
with 10 or more tested students and who were still in the school in the 2004/05
school year (the last year for which complete administrative data were available

11

See Jacob and Lefgren (2008), p.113.
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Specifically, we employ the method developed by Lewis and Linzer (2005) and embodied in the
Stata routine edvreg.
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All standard errors on the estimated teacher effects are corrected for clustering at the classroom
level using the method suggested by Moulton (1990).
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prior to arranging the principal interviews). In some cases, there were fewer than
ten teachers who met these requirements. Even in schools that had ten teachers
on the list, there were cases where some teachers were not actually working in the
respective schools at the time of the interview. If the principal was familiar with a
departed teacher and felt comfortable making an assessment, then these teachers
and subjective assessments were included in the analysis. If the principal was not
sufficiently familiar with the departed teacher, then the teacher was dropped.
Many schools had more than ten teachers. In these cases, we attempted to create
an even mix of five teachers of reading and math. If there were more than five
teachers in a specific subject, we chose a random sample of five to be included in
the list.
In the interviews, principals were first asked to mark on a sheet of paper
the principal’s overall assessment of each teacher, using a 1-9 scale.14

The

interviewer then handed the principal another sheet of paper so that he/she could
rate each teacher on each of 12 characteristics: caring, communication skills,
enthusiasm, intelligence, knowledge of subject, strong teaching skills, motivation,
works well with grade team/department, works well with me (the principal),
contributes to school activities beyond the classroom, and contributes to overall
school community. The first seven characteristics in this list were found by
Harris, Rutledge, Ingle, and Thompson (2010) to be among the most important
characteristics that principals look for when hiring teachers.15

Having an

14

The specific question was: “First, I would like you to rate each of the ten teachers relative to the
other teachers on the list. Please rate each teacher on a scale from 1-9 with 1 being not effective to
9 being exceptional. Place an X in the box to indicate your choice. Also please circle the number
of any teachers whose students are primarily special populations.”

15

As described in Harris, Rutledge, Ingle and Thompson (2010), the data in this study came from
the second in a series of interviews carried out by the researchers. During the summer of 2005,
interviews were conducted regarding the hiring process and principals preferred characteristics of
teachers. The first set of interviews was important because it helped validate the types of teacher
characteristics we consider. Principals were asked an open-ended question in the first interview
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occupation-specific list of characteristics is important because recent economic
theory and evidence suggest that different traits matter more in different
occupations and specifically that “caring” is more important in teaching than in
any other occupation (Borghans, ter Weel, and Weinberg (2008)).
The interview questions were designed so that principals would evaluate
teachers relative to others in the school.16 One reason for doing so is that even an
“absolute” evaluation would be necessarily based on each principal’s own
experiences.

This implies that ratings on individual characteristics across

principals may not be based on a common reference point or a common scale.
Therefore, like Jacob and Lefgren, we normalize the ratings of each teacher
characteristic to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one over all
teachers rated by a given principal. Given our teacher fixed-effects estimates are
within-school measures, normalizing the ratings allow us to compare withinschool ratings to within-school teacher value-added.
The final activity of the interview involved asking the principals to rate
each teacher according to the following additional “outcome” measures: raises
FCAT math achievement, raises FCAT reading achievement, and raises FCAT
writing achievement. These last measures help us test whether the differences
between the value-added measures and the principals’ overall assessments are due
to philosophical differences regarding the importance of student achievement as

about the teacher characteristics they prefer. Two-thirds of these responses could be placed in one
of 12 categories identified from previous studies on teacher quality. The list here takes those
ranked highest by principals in the first interview and then adds some of those included by Jacob
and Lefgren.
16

In contrast, in the Rockoff, et al. (forthcoming) study, principals were asked to compare each
teacher to all “teachers [they] have known who taught the same grade/subject,” not just teachers at
their own school.
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an educational outcome or to difficulty in identifying teachers who increase
student test scores.
To lessen potential multicollinearity problems and reduce the number of
teacher characteristics to analyze, we conduct a factor analysis of the 11
individual teacher characteristics rated by principals. As indicated in Table 2, the
individual characteristics can be summarized into four factors:
skills,

motivation/enthusiasm,

ability

to

work

with

interpersonal
others,

and

knowledge/teaching skills/intelligence.
Finally, as part of the interview, we discovered that principals have access
to a district-purchased software program, SnapshotTM, that allows them to create
various cross-tabulations of student achievement data on the high-stakes SSS
exam, including simple student learning gains and mean learning gains by
teacher.

While we have no data about the actual usage of this software,

subsequent informal conversations with two principals suggests that at least some
principals use the program to look at the achievement gains made by students of
each teacher. While this may have provided principals with some information
about unconditional student average achievement gains, that is of course not the
same thing as the teacher value-added scores, which are conditional on student
and peer characteristics.

Nevertheless, we calculate and analyze alternative

teacher performance measures that approximate those that principals may have
seen with the software package.

IV.

Results
In order to compute value-added scores for teachers we estimate equation

(1) using data on current and lagged test scores for grades 2-10 over the period
2000/01 through 2005/06 with the low-stakes NRT test and report these results
throughout the main text.
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A. The Association between Teacher Traits and Teacher Productivity
Simple pairwise correlations among the estimated teacher fixed effects
and the four teacher characteristic factors are presented in Table 3.

For

correlations with value-added we include correlations adjusted for estimation
error in the teacher effects. There are positive relationships between teacher
value-added in math and each of the teacher characteristic factors; correlations
adjusted for estimation error are each in the range of 0.19 to 0.34.

For reading,

the adjusted correlations between teacher traits and teacher productivity in
promoting student achievement are in the range of 0.20 to 0.45.
Teacher personality traits are all positively and strongly correlated with
one another in both subjects; correlations are in the range of 0.61 to 0.76. It is not
obvious that this should be the case, e.g., that teachers who are more
knowledgeable would also tend to have better interpersonal skills. There might
be a “halo effect” whereby teachers who are rated highly by the principal overall
are automatically given high marks on all of the individual characteristics, though
this is very difficult to test without having some other independent measure of
teacher characteristics. Finally, note that among the four teacher characteristic
factors, knowledge/teaching skills/intelligence is most closely associated with
teacher value-added in math while value-added estimates of teacher performance
in reading are most closely associated with motivation/enthusiasm of the
teacher.17

17

Our comparisons in Table 3 are between value-added based on all prior available information
and a single-year principal evaluation. If teacher productivity varies over time and principals
weight current performance more than the correlations could differ if we instead had used only
recent achievement data to form the value-added measures of teacher productivity. We explore
this issue in appendix table A3, where we present correlations of value added with principal
ratings and teacher traits using varying time periods to calculate value added. We find that the
correlations with contemporaneous (2005/06) value added are quite similar to those with value
added constructed from all prior information (1999/00-2005/06).
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A multivariate analysis of the relationship between teacher traits and
teacher value-added is presented in Table 4. Results in column [1] indicate that
knowledge/teaching skills/intelligence is positively and significantly associated
with teacher value-added in math only. None of the other coefficients in column
[1] are significant. Column [2] shows that the magnitude of the effect on math
achievement of knowledge/teaching/intelligence skills is nearly identical in
elementary and middle/high school, though the precision is much lower in
middle/high school. The overall explanatory power of the four factors is quite
low, however, with R-squared values of 0.14.18 For reading, the only factor
which is statistically significant is teacher motivation/enthusiasm. Once again,
the effect is equal in magnitude across grades, but only statistically significant for
elementary school teachers. The relative importance of subject matter knowledge
in math teacher performance is consistent with recent findings that “Teach for
America” teachers, who possess exceptionally strong academic credentials, tend
to outperform traditionally prepared teachers in teaching math, but are on par with
traditionally prepared teachers in reading instruction.19
B. The Information Principals Use in Forming Their Teacher Assessments
To determine what factors are important to a principal in forming their
evaluation of a teacher we compute pairwise correlations among the four teacher
characteristic factors and two measures of a principal’s rating of teachers: the
overall rating and the rating of the teacher’s ability to raise test scores. The
results, presented in Table 5, indicate that the overall rating is highly correlated
18

Some of the insignificant effects may be due to multicollinearity. As demonstrated in Table 3,
the four factors are all positively correlated. When each factor is regressed on estimated teacher
effects separately, all are significant except “works well with others” in predicting the value-added
of reading teachers.
19

See Boyd, et al. (2006), Kane, Rockoff and Staiger (2008) and Xu, Hannaway and Taylor
(2011).
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with the “ability to raise test scores” rating (0.73 in math and 0.74 in reading). As
with value added, principal ratings are most highly correlated with
knowledge/teaching skills/intelligence in math and motivation/enthusiasm in
reading.
A multivariate analysis of the relationship between the teacher
characteristic factors and overall principal ratings is presented in Table 6. For
math, knowledge/teaching skills/intelligence contributes the most to the
principals’ overall rating at all grade levels. At the elementary level, “works well
with others” and interpersonal skill are also statistically significant, but the point
estimates are much smaller. In reading, motivation/enthusiasm and interpersonal
skill

are

each

statistically

significant

across

all

grade

levels

while

knowledge/teaching skills/intelligence is only significantly different from zero at
the elementary level. Across both subject the four factors explain more than 80
percent of the variation in overall ratings, suggesting that the underlying 12
characteristics are important determinants of principals’ overall ratings.20
We noted above how principal ratings may be influenced by knowledge of
student test scores, especially since at least some interviewed principals had
access to software that provides student average test score gains broken down by
teacher. The achievement gain data accessible to principals are based on the
developmental scale score (DSS) derived from the high-stakes SSS exam. In
Table 7 we show that principals’ overall rankings of teachers are positively
correlated with once-lagged average SSS gains for math teachers, but overall
rankings of reading teachers are not significantly correlated with average student
achievement gains. The “ability to raise test scores” ratings are uncorrelated with

20

This result could also be driven by the halo effect described earlier. However, principals were
also asked to describe their teachers in their own words. In a working paper (Harris, Ingle, and
Rutledge, 2012), we have found that the vast majority of their responses could be placed in one of
the 12 categories, suggesting that these categories are indeed the main ones principals think about.
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average student test-score gains in both math and reading, suggesting that
principals did not use the computer software to evaluate teacher performance.
Thus while recent evidence produced by Rockoff et al in New York suggests that
principals incorporate value-added information in their assessment of teachers, in
our Florida example we do not find strong evidence that principals are influenced
by having access to simple (e.g., not conditioned on student characteristics)
average student test-score gains.
C. The Association between Principal Evaluations and Teacher Value-Added
Table 8 presents FGLS estimates of the determinants of the teacher fixed
effects, which account for estimation error in the teacher effects. The first column
reports estimates where only standard teacher credentials (experience, possession
of an advanced degree) are included as explanatory variables.

None of the

credential variables is a statistically significant determinant of teacher valueadded scores.21 .
In contrast, when a principal’s overall rating of a teacher or their
assessment of a teacher’s ability to raise test scores is added to the model, its
coefficient is positive and highly significant for both reading and math. (The
coefficients on teacher credentials are largely unchanged.) This suggests that
principals have knowledge about teacher productivity that is not captured by the
standard measures of experience and educational attainment that typically form
the basis for teacher pay scales.

The magnitudes of the coefficients are

21

In another study using statewide data from Florida (Harris and Sass (2011)), the effects of
teacher experience are highly significant when teacher fixed effects are excluded, but withinteacher changes in experience are less often statistically significant. The finding that experience is
insignificant in models with teacher fixed effects could mean that some apparent cross-teacher
experience effects are due to attrition of less effective teachers early in their careers or that there is
simply insufficient within-teacher variation in experience over a short panel The lack of
significance may also be due to the relatively small sample size and the fact that the district being
studied has a relatively high average level of teacher experience.
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substantial. For example, the coefficient on principals’ overall ratings for math
teachers in Table 8 is 0.059, which implies that a teacher who is rated one point
higher on the 1-9 scale raises student math test scores six hundreths of a standard
deviation. Put differently, given the standard deviation in principal ratings is
1.68, a one-standard deviation in increase in the principal’s overall rating of a
math teacher corresponds to a 0.10 standard deviation increase in the teacher’s
student’s test scores or moving students from the 50th to the 54th percentile.
In Table 9 we present estimates where the correlation between principal
ratings and estimated teacher value-added is allowed to vary between elementary
school and middle/high school. At both the elementary and middle/high school
levels, the overall principal rating is positively and statistically significantly
associated with the teacher fixed effect in both reading and in math. The “ability
to raise test scores” rating is also statistically significant in all but middle/high
school reading.22 However, the association between teacher value-added and a
one-point increase in the principal’s rating scale on teacher value-added in
reading is generally smaller than for math. This is consistent with the general
finding in the literature that the effects of teacher characteristics on student
achievement tend to be less pronounced in reading. It is often suggested that
reading scores are more likely to be influenced by factors outside of school;
students may read books in their free time, but they seldom work math problems
for enjoyment. Alternatively, principals may not be as good at evaluating the
performance of teachers in reading instruction.

22

Three of the statistically significant coefficients in Table 10 (overall ratings in middle/high math
and reading; ability to raise test scores in middle/high math) are statistically insignificant in the
model that includes student fixed effects. Put differently, there are no statistically significant
partial correlations between any of the middle high school principal ratings and teacher valueadded. See appendix tables for details.
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One would expect that the longer a principal has known their teachers the
more accurate would be the principal’s evaluation of their performance. Further,
principals may gain general human capital in personnel evaluation as their
experience as a supervisor increases.

To test these ideas we regress the

correlation between teacher fixed effects and principal evaluations on the duration
of a principal’s tenure as principal at their current school (representing teacherspecific knowledge) and the principal’s years of experience in educational
administration (a proxy for general personnel evaluation skills).

Results are

presented in Table 10. We find mixed evidence regarding the above hypotheses.
School-specific experience and general administrative experience are not
significantly correlated with the relationship between value-added and principal
ratings of reading teachers. With small sample sizes of 22-26 principals, the
limited statistical significance is unsurprising.
The coefficient on principals’ tenure in the school is positive and
significant in the regression predicting the correlation between value-added and a
principal’s overall evaluation of math teachers, but the opposite holds when we
turn to principal school-specific tenure. The negative coefficient on “ability to
raise test scores” is surprising, but there are at least two possible explanations.
Principals, as they get to know teachers, may begin to assess them more based on
their relationships (i.e., how well the principal gets along teachers) rather than
objective performance, though this hypothesis is difficult to test with these data.
Also, we estimated the value-added models with a second specification (the same
as equation (1) but with the addition of student fixed effects) and the negative
coefficient is essentially zero in that case (see appendix tables).
In addition to general correlations, we also consider the ability of
principals to identify productive teachers at various parts of the teacher valueadded distribution. In Table 11 we present cross-tabulations of the rankings of
teacher value-added and principals’ ratings of teachers on both the “overall” and
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“ability to raise test scores” metrics.23 It appears that for both math and reading,
principals are better at identifying low value-added teachers, rather than topperforming teachers. Of those teachers who rank in the bottom 30 percent based
on value-added in math, 65 percent are also ranked in the bottom 30 percent by
their principal. In contrast, only 16 percent of teachers in the top 30 percent in
math value-added are also ranked in the 30 percent by their principal. Similar
differences appear for reading teachers.24
Our findings differ from those of Jacob and Lefgren (2008). They find
that principals are relatively good at distinguishing both high and low value-added
teachers, with a somewhat better alignment of principal ratings with teacher
value-added for the top rated teachers. At least two possible explanations for the
divergent results come to mind. The underlying distribution of teacher quality
may be more uniform in our sample, making it more difficult to distinguish the
best teachers from middling teachers. Alternatively, some groups of principals
may simply be better than others in identifying high-value-added teachers. In
either case, the principals in both Jacob and Lefgren’s analysis and in the present
study seem to be able to identify their lowest-performing teachers.
D. The Relative Ability of Prior Performance and Teacher Rankings to Predict
Future Teacher Performance
To this point, as in all prior studies, we have been comparing principal
evaluations of teachers with value-added measures constructed from all available
prior student test scores (i.e. principal ratings from summer 2006 with value23

In addition to the three-category rankings presented in Table 5, we also computed crosstabulations based on quintile rankings. The patterns of results were very similar. Given there are
at most 10 teachers per school, the three-category ranking system seems more appropriate.

24

The fact that in the high (low) category, teachers can only move down (up) whereas those in the
middle can move in two directions could explain why the proportion of teachers with similar
rankings is higher in the middle category than in the top category, but it does not explain why the
proportion with similar rankings in the bottom category is higher.
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added based on achievement data up through the 2005/06 school year). Such
contemporaneous estimates of teacher productivity are relevant to decisions about
the role of principal evaluations in measuring and rewarding past performance.
However, contemporaneous measures of teacher performance are not particularly
relevant for retention and tenure decisions, where the decision should (optimally)
be based on predictions about future performance.
We measure future teacher productivity by re-estimating equation (1),
using data on student achievement gains from the 2006/07 and 2007/08 school
years (including test scores from 2005/06 as the initial lagged value) to derive
estimates of future teacher value-added. As demonstrated by (McCaffrey, et al.
(2009)), basing teacher value-added on two years of performance leads to much
more precise estimates than relying on a single estimated test score gain, as in
Jacob and Lefgren (2008). We then regress our estimate of future value-added on
either the principal’s overall rating of the teacher from the summer of 2006 or the
estimated teacher fixed effect from a student achievement model covering the
years 1999/00-2005/06.25
As shown in Table 12, we estimate the equation several ways, varying the
amount of information used to estimate the past teacher value-added. With the
exception of the value-added measure constructed from only 2005/06 data, we
utilize a common sample to ensure comparability of the value-added estimates.
The sample of teachers with value-added data for 2005/06 is much smaller,
however. This is because we selected teachers to participate in the study in the
25

In addition to the estimates reported in Table 12, we also estimated the relationship between
past value added and principal ratings and future teacher value-added using empirical Bayes
estimates of teacher value added. The empirical Bayes method “shrinks” teacher effect estimates
toward the population mean, with the degree of shrinkage proportional to the standard error of the
teacher effect estimate (see Morris (1983)). Jacob and Lefgren (2008) argue that estimation error
in the teacher effects will produce attenuation bias when teacher effects are used as an explanatory
variable in a regression context. However, we obtain results similar to those reported in Table 12
when we use Empirical Bayes estimates in place of the non-shrunken teacher fixed effects.
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late spring of 2006, based on whether they had student achievement data for the
most recent year available at that time (the 2004/05 school year). A teacher with
achievement data for 2004/05 who subsequently left the school (or who switched
to a non-tested grade and subject) would therefore be excluded from the 2005/06
value-added sample. Rather than toss out a large proportion of the sample for all
years, we report one-year value-added estimates for 2005/06 using the reduced
sample. To distinguish between sample-size effects and differences due to the
number of years of student achievement used to estimate teacher value-added, we
also report results using single-year value-added estimates for 2004/05, which
utilize the full sample of teachers.
It is not obvious a priori which of the measures should be the best
predictors of future value-added, even when past value-added includes six years
of information. On the one hand, we would expect value-added based on fewer
years of prior information to be less precise, both because it is based on fewer
student test scores and because it is subject to non-persistent changes in the
student and teacher performance (e.g. a particularly disruptive student during the
school year, student illnesses on exam day or temporary teacher health and family
issues). On the other hand, actual (persistent) teacher performance could change
over time, in which case teacher value-added from six years ago may not be very
informative about the future, e.g., if a teacher received tenure four years ago and
reduced effort thereafter then the two years of value-added information prior to
the tenure decision will be misleading.
Our results support the first hypothesis, that random error is the key factor
driving year-to-year variation in performance measures.

Using all available

information, past value-added outperforms principal ratings, explaining over five
times as much of the variation in future value-added among math teachers and
nearly 30 times as much of the variation in future value-added among reading

25

teachers.26 The edge in explanatory power (as measured by R-squared) holds up
when only three, two or even a single year of data is used to compute past value
added though the differential generally falls as value added is computed from
fewer years of data. Thus if only a single measure is employed, past value added
is superior to principal evaluations in predicting future teacher value added.
When prior value-added and principal ratings are combined to predict
future teacher performance, the contribution of principal ratings to the predictive
power of the model also depends on the precision of the past value-added
measure. When past value-added is based on all six years of achievement gain
data before Summer 2006, principal ratings add virtually nothing to the predictive
power of past value-added in math or reading. The same is true when three or
two years of student achievement data are used to compute prior value added.
The results are mixed when past-added is based on a single year of data. If data
from 2004/05 (and the constant sample of teachers) are used, combining prior
value-added with principal evaluations increases the proportion of variation in
future value added that is explained from 6.6 percent to 9.1 percent in math and
from 2.0 percent to 2.3 percent in reading, though it is not possible to reject the
null that principal ratings are uncorrelated with future value added (conditional on
past value added). When data from 2005/06 alone (and the associated smaller
sample) are used to construct prior value-added, principal ratings (which are
typically based on multiple years of observation) do have a statistically significant
correlation with future value added, conditional on past value added, in math.
However, the improvement in explanatory power (measured by R-squared) is
modest, 18 percent to 22 percent. Similarly, adding principal evaluations to one-

26

Similar results are obtained when we exclude achievement data from the 05/06 school year from
the value-added calculation and use only four years of test-score data (as in Jacob and Lefren
(2008)).
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year past value-added boosts the ability to predict future value added slightly,
from 11 percent to 12 percent.

V.

Summary and Conclusions
Consistent with prior research, we find that estimates of teachers’

contributions to student achievement or “value-added” are at best weakly
correlated with readily observable teacher characteristics like attainment of
advanced degrees, indicating that other factors may be relatively more important
in determining teacher productivity. Prior economic research suggests that noncognitive factors may be particularly important, and often overlooked,
determinants of productivity in occupations like teaching. We find that teacher
value-added is correlated with traditional human capital measures like teacher
intelligence, subject knowledge and teaching skills in math, while personality
traits like motivation and enthusiasm are associated with high productivity among
reading teachers. It may be that the non-cognitive teacher skills and traits that we
find to be associated with teacher productivity in generating student achievement
also contribute to non-academic outcomes as well. For example, Chetty et al.
(2011) find that kindergarten class quality (including teacher quality) has
significant effects on later non-cognitive outcomes, which in turn are associated
with higher earnings, even though the impact of kindergarten class quality on
student test scores fades out by middle school. Similarly, Chetty, Friedman, and
Rockoff (2011) find that the influence of high-value-added elementary teachers is
strongly correlated with both earnings in adulthood and non-pecuniary choices
later in life, like the probability of teenage child-bearing.
The fact that non-cognitive factors are sometimes related to teacher valueadded suggests that direct observation of potential teachers during the hiring
process and subsequent observation of teacher behavior in the classroom would
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better identify effective teachers than the traditional system of assessing teachers
on the basis of credentials alone. Thus there are potential gains from giving
school principals a greater role in evaluating teachers. In addition to their ability
to capture non-cognitive skills, evaluations by principals have a potential cost
advantage over other alternatives, like classroom observation by external
evaluators (as in the MET project). Principals collect most of their information in
the natural course of the job (e.g., informal conversations with parents, students,
and other teachers), which makes the marginal cost low.
The relative importance of intelligence, subject knowledge and teaching
skills in determining math teacher productivity has important implications for
recruiting and preparing future teachers as well. Because of the apparent role of
intelligence, this would seem to suggest that policies designed to reduce entry
barriers and encourage the “brightest” into the teaching profession could boost
student achievement. However, this is tempered by the fact that subject matter
knowledge and teaching skills seem to matter as well. Sheer intelligence may not
be enough; “good” teachers likely need to have adequate training in subject matter
content and essential teaching techniques.
While principal evaluations of teachers incorporate traits associated with
value-added, like teacher knowledge, skill and intelligence, they also include
assessments of a teacher’s interpersonal relationships with parents, other teachers
and the principal, as well as a caring attitude toward students. This divergence in
the factors associated with teacher value-added and those which are related to
principal evaluation suggest that principal evaluations of teachers may also be
useful if educational objectives beyond student achievement are valued.
The ability of principals to distinguish differences in teacher productivity
does appear to vary across principals and across the spectrum of teacher quality.
Contrary to the prior work of Jacob and Lefgren, we find that principals are much
better at identifying the least productive teachers than they are at determining
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those who are best at raising student test scores. Thus principal evaluations would
appear to be more valuable in retention decisions than in allotting rewards under a
performance-pay system.

While principals vary in their ability to identify

differences in teacher productivity, we could not identify consistent relationships
between principals evaluation ability and either their experience as an
administrator or their tenure in a school. Future research in this area, with larger
samples, could explore the ways in which principal characteristics as well as
organizational forms and hierarchies influence principals’ ability to identify
effective teachers.
Our analysis of the predictive power of principal ratings and past valueadded also informs the current policy debate over the use of test scores and
subjective evaluations to evaluate current teachers. When value-added measures
are constructed from multiple years of test score data, past value-added does a
much better job at predicting future value-added than do principal evaluations.
However, if one only uses a single year of information to estimate prior teacher
value-added, principal evaluations add some information, though the gains are
modest. Thus subjective measures are likely to be of greatest value when making
retention and tenure decisions, especially for early-career teachers, for whom
there may be only a year or two of student test-score information.
While our analysis is informative regarding the various ways that teachers
could be assessed, it is important to be cautious in drawing broad policy
conclusions from these results. For example, while we have shown that prior
value-added is the best predictor of future value-added, future value-added is not
necessarily an accurate indicator of overall future teacher productivity.27 Valueadded is a noisy measure of a teacher’s impact on current student achievement

27

The same critique applies to the MET project, which investigates the relationship between value
added and classroom observational assessments from trained raters.
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and may not capture other valuable contributions a teacher makes to a student’s
long-run success.28

Also, the fact that principals’ assessments are positively

related to future value-added, and sometimes add information beyond prior value
added, does not mean that evaluating teachers based on principals’ assessments
would necessarily be a wise policy for high-stakes personnel decisions. The
assessments that principals offered in our study involved no financial or
employment implications for teachers and principals’ stated judgments could well
differ in a high-stakes context. Also, even if principals would give the same
assessments in high-stakes settings, doing so could influence the working
relationships between principals and teachers in unproductive ways.
While caution is warranted, the practical reality is that many school
systems around the country are already making radical changes to the way in
which teachers are evaluated and compensated. Our results suggest principal
evaluations can be a useful component of these new teacher assessment systems.
First, employing principal evaluations is likely to be superior to the traditional
credential and seniority based system of compensating teachers.

Second, in

systems where “value-added” metrics are used, including principal evaluations
will be most informative for early-career teachers (where value-added information
is less reliable). Third, because principals appear to be better at identifying the
least productive teachers rather than the top performers, principal evaluations are
more likely to be a reliable factor in termination decisions rather than in
performance-pay systems.

Finally, because principal evaluations take into

account a broader set of teacher traits than those which directly affect student test
scores, evaluations of teachers by principals are likely to be a useful component of
teacher assessment when outcomes beyond student achievement are valued.
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For evidence on the relationship between value-added and long-run student outcomes, see
Chetty, Friedman and Rockoff (2011).
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Table 1
Sample Student and Teacher Characteristics

___________________________________________________________________________
Math
Sample

Reading
Sample

_________________ _________________
No. of Obs.

Mean

No. of Obs.

Mean

___________________________________________________________________________
Students
Black
Hispanic
Free/Reduced Price Lunch
Achievement Gain
Teachers
Male
White
Hold Advanced Degree
Fully Certified
Taught Primarily Elementary School
Taught Primarily Middle School
Taught Primarily High School
Principal’s Overall Rating
Rating of Ability to Raise Test Scores
Rating on “Caring”
Rating on “Enthusiastic”
Rating on “Motivated”
Rating on “Strong Teaching Skills”
Rating on “Knows Subject”
Rating on “Communication Skills”
Rating on “Intelligence”
Rating on “Positive Relationship with Parents”
Rating on “Positive Relationship with Students”

31645
31645
31645
31645

0.367
0.025
0.335
20.729

30794
30794
30794
30794

0.360
0.024
0.329
18.581

1023
1023
1004
1015
1023
1023
1023
237
210
237
237
237
237
237
237
237
236
236

0.115
0.695
0.332
0.950
0.727
0.149
0.124
7.084
7.200
7.384
7.249
7.414
7.544
7.848
7.612
7.911
7.483
7.636

1024
1024
1008
1019
1024
1024
1024
231
201
231
231
231
231
231
231
231
230
230

0.079
0.724
0.350
0.955
0.729
0.141
0.130
7.134
7.184
7.463
7.372
7.481
7.636
7.918
7.758
7.970
7.600
7.739

___________________________________________________________________________
Note: Includes only students and teachers for which a fixed effect could be computed for the teacher.
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Table 2
Factor Loadings of Normalized Principal Ratings

______________________________________________________________________________
Teacher Characteristic
Rated by Principal

Interpersonal
Skills

Motivation/
Enthusiasm

Works Well
With Others

Knowledge/
Teaching Skills/
Intelligence

______________________________________________________________________________
Math

______________________________________________________________________________
Intelligent
Works Well With Grade Team/Dept.
Works Well With Me (Principal)
Positive Relationship With Parents
Positive Relationship With Students
Caring
Enthusiastic
Motivated
Strong Teaching Skills
Knows Subject
Communication Skills

-0.0481
-0.0046
0.1743
0.7231
0.9408
0.5591
0.1086
0.0398
0.1512
-0.0088
0.1040

0.0839
-0.0887
0.0835
0.0781
0.0103
0.1372
0.9721
0.5224
0.0258
-0.0551
0.1705

0.0606
0.9711
0.7415
0.0768
-0.0131
0.2422
-0.0707
0.2802
-0.0462
-0.0036
0.2734

0.7067
0.0399
-0.0814
0.0742
0.0636
-0.0185
-0.0035
0.1624
0.8471
0.9831
0.3191

______________________________________________________________________________
Reading

______________________________________________________________________________
Intelligent
Works Well With Grade Team/Dept.
Works Well With Me (Principal)
Positive Relationship With Parents
Positive Relationship With Students
Caring
Enthusiastic
Motivated
Strong Teaching Skills
Knows Subject
Communication Skills

-0.0138
0.0179
0.1507
0.7559
0.9195
0.5970
0.0728
0.0728
0.2269
-0.0814
0.1484

0.0094
-0.0581
0.0409
0.0511
0.0258
0.0989
0.9942
0.5289
0.0127
-0.0201
0.2225

0.0445
0.8646
0.8251
0.0637
0.0181
0.2610
-0.0476
0.1894
-0.0854
0.0333
0.1855

0.7064
0.0704
-0.0558
0.0741
0.0287
-0.0385
-0.0225
0.2529
0.8175
0.9840
0.3214

______________________________________________________________________________
Note: Principal ratings are normalized within principal to have mean zero and variance of one. Factor analysis uses
maximum likelihood method. Factor loadings based on promax rotation.
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Table 3
Pairwise Correlation of Estimated Teacher Fixed With Teacher Characteristic Factors

______________________________________________________________________________
Estimated
Teacher
FE

Interpersonal
Skills

Motivation/
Enthusiasm

Works
Well
With
Others

Knowledge/
Teaching
Skills/
Intelligence

______________________________________________________________________________
Math

______________________________________________________________________________
Estimated Teacher FE
Interpersonal Skills
Motivation/Enthusiasm
Works Well With Others
Knowledge/Teaching Skills/
Intelligence

1.000
0.174**
[0.194]
0.202**
[0.225]
0.189**
[0.211]
0.309**
[0.344]

1.000
0.734**

1.000

0.756**

0.732**

1.000

0.612**

0.682**

0.644**

1.000

______________________________________________________________________________
Reading

______________________________________________________________________________
Estimated Teacher FE
Interpersonal Skills
Motivation/Enthusiasm
Works Well With Others
Knowledge/Teaching Skills
Intelligence

1.000
0.166**
[0.223]
0.336**
[0.450]
0.222**
[0.298]
0.153**
[0.205]

1.000
0.631**

1.000

0.716**

0.683**

1.000

0.762**

0.650**

0.676**

1.000

______________________________________________________________________________
Note: **indicates significance at the .05 level. Correlations adjusted for estimation error in estimated teacher fixed
effects are in brackets.
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Table 4
FGLS Estimates of the Relationship Between
Teacher Fixed Effects and Teacher Characteristic Factors
(Grades 2 – 10, 1999/2000 – 2005/06)

______________________________________________________________________________
Math
_____________________________
[1]

Reading
____________________________

[2]

[1]

[2]

______________________________________________________________________________
Interpersonal Skill

-0.004
(0.023)

-0.010
(0.015)

Knowledge/Teaching Skills/
Intelligence

0.058***
(0.019)

-0.009
(0.014)

Motivation/Enthusiasm

0.008
(0.022)

0.042***
(0.013)

Works Well With Others

-0.001
(0.023)

0.014
(0.014)

Interpersonal Skill
 Elementary

-0.009
(0.025)

-0.006
(0.017)

Interpersonal Skill
 Middle/High

0.018
(0.058)

-0.023
(0.037)

Knowledge/Teaching Skills/
Intelligence  Elementary

0.057***
(0.022)

-0.013
(0.016)

Knowledge/Teaching Skills/
Intelligence  Middle/High

0.054
(0.044)

0.007
(0.035)

Motivation/Enthusiasm
 Elementary

0.007
(0.025)

0.043***
(0.014)

Motivation/Enthusiasm
 Middle/High

0.027
(0.063)

0.044
(0.037)

Works Well With Others
 Elementary

0.008
(0.026)

0.017
(0.016)

Works Well With Others
 Middle/High

-0.046
(0.059)

0.003
(0.026)

_____________________________________________________________________________
R-squared
No. of Observations

0.137
207

0.140
207

0.145
203

0.148
203

______________________________________________________________________________
Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance at .10 level, **indicates
significance at the .05 level and *** indicates significance at the .01 level in a two-tailed test. All models include
controls for teacher experience, attainment of an advanced degree and a constant term.
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Table 5
Pairwise Correlation of Principal Ratings of Teachers With Teacher Characteristic Factors

______________________________________________________________________________

Overall
Rating

Ability
to Raise
Test
Scores

Interpersonal
Skills

Motivation/
Enthusiasm

Works Knowledge/
Well
Teaching
With
Skills/
Others Intelligence

______________________________________________________________________________
Math

______________________________________________________________________________
Overall Rating

1.000

Ability to Raise Test Scores

0.733**

1.000

Interpersonal Skills

0.703**

0.550**

1.000

Motivation/Enthusiasm

0.738**

0.596**

0.734**

1.000

Works Well With Others

0.762**

0.598**

0.756**

0.732**

1.000

Knowledge/Teaching Skills/
Intelligence

0.881**

0.752**

0.612**

0.682**

0.644**

1.000

______________________________________________________________________________
Reading

______________________________________________________________________________
Overall Rating

1.000

Ability to Raise Test Scores

0.741**

1.000

Interpersonal Skills

0.709**

0.626**

1.000

Motivation/Enthusiasm

0.856**

0.702**

0.631**

1.000

Works Well With Others

0.697**

0.569**

0.716**

0.684**

1.000

Knowledge/Teaching Skills
Intelligence

0.723**

0.589**

0.763**

0.650**

0.676**

1.000

______________________________________________________________________________
Note: **indicates significance at the .05 level. Correlations adjusted for estimation error in estimated teacher fixed
effects are in brackets.
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Table 6
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of the Relationship Between
Principal Overall Ratings of Teachers and Teacher Characteristic Factors
(Grades 2 – 10, 1999/2000 – 2005/06)

______________________________________________________________________________
Math
_____________________________
[1]

Reading
____________________________

[2]

[1]

[2]

______________________________________________________________________________
Interpersonal Skill

0.096**
(0.047)

0.187***
(0.056)

Knowledge/Teaching Skills/
Intelligence

0.608***
(0.040)

0.156***
(0.054)

Motivation/Enthusiasm

0.054
(0.046)

0.601***
(0.048)

Works Well With Others

0.233***
(0.047)

0.024
(0.052)

Interpersonal Skill

 Elementary

0.108**
(0.052)

0.130**
(0.062)

Interpersonal Skill
 Middle/High

0.051
(0.124)

0.505***
(0.137)

Knowledge/Teaching Skills/

Intelligence Elementary

0.615***
(0.045)

0.190***
(0.058)

Knowledge/Teaching Skills/
Intelligence  Middle/High

0.599***
(0.096)

-0.031
(0.140)

Motivation/Enthusiasm
 Elementary

0.043
(0.050)

0.613***
(0.050)

Motivation/Enthusiasm
 Middle/High

0.176
(0.135)

0.440***
(0.145)

Works Well With Others
 Elementary

0.248***
(0.052)

0.056
(0.058)

Works Well With Others
 Middle/High

0.112
(0.126)

-0.048
(0.108)

______________________________________________________________________________
R-squared
No. of Observations

0.852
207

0.854
207

0.805
203

0.814
203

______________________________________________________________________________
Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance at .10 level, **indicates significance
at the .05 level and *** indicates significance at the .01 level in a two-tailed test. All models include controls for
teacher experience, attainment of an advanced degree and a constant term.
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Table 7
Pairwise Correlation of Estimated Teacher Fixed Effects,
Principal’s Rating of Teachers and Average Student Developmental Scale Score Gains
(Teachers with Students who took FCAT-SSS exam in 2003/04 and 2004/05 or 2004/05 and 2005/06)

______________________________________________________________________________
Estimated
Teacher
FE

Overall
Rating

Ability
to Raise
Test Scores

Average
Dev. Scale
Score Gain
(2004/05)

Average
Dev. Scale
Score Gain
(2005/06)

______________________________________________________________________________
Math

______________________________________________________________________________
Estimated Teacher FE

1.000

Overall Rating

0.204**
[0.232]

1.000

Ability to Raise Test Scores

0.273**
[0.310]

0.674**

1.000

Average DSS Gain
(2004/05)

0.189**
[0.214]

0.189**

0.108

1.000

Average DSS Gain
(2005/06)

0.268**
[0.304]

0.055

0.121

0.370**

1.000

______________________________________________________________________________
Reading

______________________________________________________________________________
Estimated Teacher FE

1.000

Overall Rating

0.190**
[0.244]

1.000

Ability to Raise Test Scores

0.142
[0.182]

0.676**

1.000

Average DSS Gain
(2004/05)

-0.401
[-0.052]

0.146

0.063

1.000

Average DSS Gain
(2005/06)

0.128
[0.164]

0.088

0.069

0.495**

1.000

______________________________________________________________________________
Note: **indicates significance at the .05 level. Correlations adjusted for estimation error in estimated teacher fixed
effects are in brackets.
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Table 8
FGLS Estimates of the Determinants of Teacher Fixed Effects
(Grades 2 – 10, 1999/2000 – 2005/06)

___________________________________________________________________________
Math
________________________________
[1]

[2]

[3]

Reading
_______________________________
[1]

[2]

[3]

___________________________________________________________________________
Overall Rating

0.059***
(0.013)

Ability to Raise Test Scores

0.038***
(0.008)
0.066***
(0.034)

0.031***
(0.009)

1-2 Years of Experience

0.048
(0.176)

0.105
(0.169)

0.076
(0.181)

0.027
(0.108)

0.025
(0.104)

0.054
(0.146)

3-5 Years of Experience

0.089
(0.128)

0.103
(0.123)

0.095
(0.131)

0.064
(0.082)

0.051
(0.078)

0.070
(0.111)

6-12 Years of Experience

0.076
(0.124)

0.115
(0.119)

0.086
(0.127)

0.052
(0.080)

0.057
(0.077)

0.079
(0.110)

13-20 Years of Experience

0.038
(0.124)

0.082
(0.119)

0.076
(0.127)

0.041
(0.080)

0.046
(0.077)

0.060
(0.111)

21-27 Years of Experience

0.134
(0.125)

0.158
(0.120)

0.136
(0.126)

0.085
(0.080)

0.072
(0.077)

0.106
(0.111)

28+ Years of Experience

0.092
(0.127)

0.134
(0.122)

0.093
(0.130)

0.078
(0.081)

0.077
(0.078)

0.093
(0.112)

Advanced Degree

-0.022
(0.026)

-0.025
(0.025)

-0.013
(0.027)

-0.001
(0.017)

-0.003
(0.016)

-0.010
(0.018)

_________________________________________________________________________________________
R-squared
No. of Observations

0.026

0.110

0.137

0.025

0.114

0.091

237

237

202

231

231

201

___________________________________________________________________________
Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance at .10 level, **indicates
significance at the .05 level and *** indicates significance at the .01 level in a two-tailed test. All models include a
constant term.
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Table 9
FGLS Estimates of the Determinants of Teacher Fixed Effects,
Allowing for Differential Effects by Grade Group
(Grades 2 – 10, 1999/2000 – 2005/06)

___________________________________________________________________________
Math
________________________________
[1]

[2]

[3]

Reading
_______________________________
[1]

[2]

[3]

___________________________________________________________________________
Overall Rating Elementary

0.060***
(0.015)

0.038***
(0.009)

Overall Rating Middle/High

0.053**
(0.025)

0.040**
(0.016)

Ability to Raise Test Scores
Elementary

0.070***
(0.016)

0.044***
(0.010)

Ability to Raise Test Scores
Middle/High

0.055**
(0.026)

0.000
(0.016)

1-2 Years of Experience

0.048
(0.176)

0.104
(0.170)

0.078
(0.181)

0.027
(0.108)

0.024
(0.104)

0.105
(0.146)

3-5 Years of Experience

0.089
(0.128)

0.101
(0.124)

0.094
(0.132)

0.064
(0.082)

0.051
(0.079)

0.096
(0.110)

6-12 Years of Experience

0.076
(0.124)

0.115
(0.120)

0.085
(0.127)

0.052
(0.080)

0.056
(0.077)

0.114
(0.110)

13-20 Years of Experience

0.038
(0.124)

0.081
(0.120)

0.074
(0.127)

0.041
(0.080)

0.045
(0.077)

0.091
(0.110)

21-27 Years of Experience

0.134
(0.125)

0.157
(0.120)

0.134
(0.127)

0.085
(0.080)

0.071
(0.077)

0.135
(0.110)

28+ Years of Experience

0.092
(0.127)

0.133
(0.123)

0.094
(0.130)

0.078
(0.081)

0.076
(0.078)

0.130
(0.112)

Advanced Degree

-0.023
(0.026)

-0.023
(0.025)

-0.013
(0.027)

-0.001
(0.017)

-0.004
(0.016)

-0.005
(0.017)

___________________________________________________________________________
R-squared
No. of Observations

0.026

0.110

0.138

0.025

0.114

0.116

237

237

202

231

231

201

___________________________________________________________________________
Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance at .10 level, **indicates
significance at the .05 level and *** indicates significance at the .01 level in a two-tailed test. All models include a
constant term.
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Table 10
FGLS Estimates of the Determinants of the
Correlation Between Teacher Fixed Effects and Principal Evaluations

____________________________________________________________________________
Math
_____________________________
[1]

[2]

[3]

Reading
___________________________
[1]

[2]

[3]

____________________________________________________________________________
Correlation Between Teacher Effects and Overall Rating of Teacher

____________________________________________________________________________
Principal’s Tenure at School

0.021
(0.020)

Principal’s Total Experience
in Ed. Administration

0.039*
(0.023)
-0.009
(0.014)

-0.008
(0.021)

-0.023
(0.015)

0.006
(0.026)
-0.012
(0.013)

-0.014
(0.016)

____________________________________________________________________________
R-squared
No. of Observations

0.042
26

0.019
26

0.124
26

0.008
22

0.043
22

0.046
22

____________________________________________________________________________
Correlation Between Teacher Effects and “Ability to Raise Test Scores”

____________________________________________________________________________
Principal’s Tenure at School

-0.029
(0.019)

Principal’s Total Experience
in Ed. Administration

-0.045**
(0.023)
0.001
(0.017)

0.008
(0.020)

0.024
(0.020)

0.009
(0.027)
0.003
(0.017)

-0.002
(0.023)

____________________________________________________________________________
R-squared
No. of Observations

0.010
24

0.015
24

0.155
24

0.008
22

0.002
22

0.008
22

____________________________________________________________________________
Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance at .10 level, **indicates significance
at the .05 level and *** indicates significance at the .01 level in a two-tailed test. All models include a constant
term. Data on principal placements are only available from 1995 forward, so tenure at school is truncated at 10
years.
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Table 11
Rankings of Teacher Fixed Effects by Principal Ratings of Teachers
Math
Principal’s “Overall Rating of Teacher”
Percentile Ranking
Teacher Fixed Effects
Percentile Ranking

Bottom
30%

Middle
40%

Top
30%

Bottom 30%

65

24

11

Middle 40%

51

32

18

Top 30%

32

52

16

Reading
Principal’s “Overall Rating of Teacher”
Percentile Ranking
Teacher Fixed Effects
Percentile Ranking

Bottom
30%

Middle
40%

Top
30%

Bottom 30%

54

29

17

Middle 40%

41

40

19

Top 30%

34

45

21

Note: cell entries represent row percentages. Only schools with 5 or more rated teachers are included.
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Table 12
FLGS Estimates of the Determinants of Teacher Effects in 2006/07 – 2007/08
(Only Teachers Teaching in Same School in Which They Were Previously Rated by Principal)

____________________________________________________________________________
Math
_____________________________
[1]

[2]

[3]

Reading
___________________________
[1]

[2]

[3]

____________________________________________________________________________
Prior Value-Added Based on Up to Six Years of Teacher Performance

____________________________________________________________________________
Prior Value-Added
(from 00/01-05/06)

0.562***
(0.077)

Principal’s Overall Rating
(Summer 2006)

0.532***
(0.079)
0.052***
(0.019)

0.724***
(0.136)

0.025
(0.017)

0.756***
(0.144)
0.019
(0.021)

-0.014
(0.021)

____________________________________________________________________________
R-squared
No. of Observations

0.255
158

0.048
158

0.265
158

0.172
138

0.006
138

0.175
138

____________________________________________________________________________
Prior Value-Added Based on Up to Three Years of Teacher Performance

____________________________________________________________________________
Prior Value-Added
(from 03/04-05/06)

0.527***
(0.067)

Principal’s Overall Rating
(Summer 2006)

0.507***
(0.070)
0.052***
(0.019)

0.371***
(0.081)

0.015
(0.017)

0.377***
(0.085)
0.019
(0.021)

-0.005
(0.021)

____________________________________________________________________________
R-squared
No. of Observations

0.286
158

0.048
158

0.290
158

0.132
138

0.006
138

0.133
138

____________________________________________________________________________
Prior Value-Added Based on Up to Two Years of Teacher Performance

____________________________________________________________________________
Prior Value-Added
(from 04/05-05/06)

0.537***
(0.065)

Principal’s Overall Rating
(Summer 2006)

0.514***
(0.067)
0.052***
(0.019)

0.527***
(0.105)

0.022
(0.016)

0.529***
(0.108)
0.019
(0.021)

-0.002
(0.020)

____________________________________________________________________________
R-squared
No. of Observations

0.304
158

0.048
158

0.312
158

0.156
138

0.006
138

0.156
138

____________________________________________________________________________
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____________________________________________________________________________
Prior Value-Added Based on One Year of Teacher Performance (2004/05)

____________________________________________________________________________
Prior Value-Added
(from 04/05)

0.147***
(0.044)

Principal’s Overall Rating
(Summer 2006)

0.123***
(0.045)
0.052***
(0.019)

0.098*
(0.059)

0.039
(0.019)

0.092
(0.060)
0.019
(0.021)

0.015
(0.021)

____________________________________________________________________________
R-squared
No. of Observations

0.066
158

0.048
158

0.091
158

0.020
138

0.006
138

0.023
138

____________________________________________________________________________
Prior Value-Added Based on One Year of Teacher Performance (2005/06)

____________________________________________________________________________
Prior Value-Added
(from 05/06)

0.343***
(0.064)

Principal’s Overall Rating
(Summer 2006)

0.301***
(0.065)
0.071***
(0.020)

0.282***
(0.076)

0.048**
(0.019)

0.271***
(0.076)
0.038
(0.023)

0.031
(0.022)

____________________________________________________________________________
R-squared
No. of Observations

0.179
132

0.086
132

0.217
132

0.109
114

0.023
114

0.124
114

____________________________________________________________________________
Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance at .10 level, **indicates significance
at the .05 level and *** indicates significance at the .01 level in a two-tailed test. All models include a constant
term.
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